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The Public Use of Reparations: How Land-Based 
Reparations Can Satisfy the Public Use 
Requirement of the Takings Clause  
Jack Davis 
  INTRODUCTION   
Emancipation, one of our nation’s boldest and most morally 
profound acts, rested upon the hope that a dramatic reconception 
of property would take root. Almost four million African Ameri-
cans gained the rights and remedies of personhood, no longer to 
be property.1 This transformation also carried with it one of our 
nation’s most enduring property problems. Freed African Amer-
icans had no land or wealth of their own. They had only their 
labor to trade,2 often to the same plantation owners who en-
slaved them before.3 The closest the nation came to meaningfully 
 
  University of Minnesota Law School J.D. Candidate, 2020. I would like 
to thank Professor Brad Karkkainen for sharing his understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and American history with me, and for helping me see and confront 
the difficult problems. I would like to thank the editors and staffers of the Min-
nesota Law Review for their thoroughness and rigor and for inspiring in me the 
same. I would like to thank my family for encouraging me to think broadly and 
to care about justice and the health of our communities. I would like to thank 
all my teachers and friends for a lifetime of stimulating conversations. Copy-
right © 2020 by Jack Davis.  
 1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860, 
at vii (1864), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/ 
population/1860a-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2WP-QQZS]; see Paul Finkelbaum, 
Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTAND-
ING OF SLAVERY 117 (Jean Allain ed., 2012). 
 2. Cf. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 11 (1985) (discussing the foundation that first possession 
serves in a natural rights theory of property and noting that those excluded 
from first possession trade their labor for property). 
 3. See generally JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
ILLNESS AND SUFFERING DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (2012) 
(observing that the popular narrative around Emancipation often overlooks the 
struggles that freed African Americans faced immediately, such as starvation, 
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addressing the property needs of freed African Americans came 
when the Freedmen’s Bureau, a short-lived federal agency, 
promised African American families “forty acres and a mule,” 
but this was cut short when President Johnson granted amnesty 
to white Southerners and fully restored their property rights, 
virtually eliminating the reserve of land available for African 
Americans.4 
The importance of home and property ownership for individ-
ual health and happiness is deeply engrained in American 
thought,5 yet this value has not been seriously brought to bear 
upon Emancipation. In the wake of our nation’s stunted response 
to the lack of African American property, it is not surprising that 
black Americans are more likely to be living in housing with con-
centrated poverty than white Americans.6 Homeownership has 
long been viewed as an important factor for individual and inter-
generational wealth accumulation.7 Land8 or housing-based rep-
arations aimed at increasing homeownership among African 
Americans could address both the concrete reality of present-day 
 
which led them often back to work on plantations or to prisons—often old plan-
tation cells themselves). 
 4. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S 
BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 25–71, 181–89 (1978). 
 5. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) 
(“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”), with JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREA-
TISE OF GOVERNMENT 46 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g. Co. 1980) (1689) 
(“life, liberty, and estate”). 
 6. KALWANT BHOPAL, WHITE PRIVILEGE 151–52 (2018). 
 7. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT ET AL., IS HOMEOWNERSHIP STILL 
AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF BUILDING WEALTH FOR LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY 
HOUSEHOLDS? (WAS IT EVER?) (2013), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/ 
default/files/hbtl-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF95-XVAV] (“[T]here continues to be 
strong support for the association between owning a home and accumulating 
wealth. This relationship held even during the tumultuous period from 1999 to 
2009, under less than ideal conditions.”). 
 8. This Note will refer to such reparations as “land-based reparations” in-
stead of the more general “property-based reparations” because money is prop-
erty and cash reparations are not the subject of this Note. The term “land,” how-
ever, risks conjuring a misleading image of rural agricultural land. Though this 
Note does not undertake to provide a model reparations bill, such a bill would 
probably not involve agricultural land and would more likely involve homeown-
ership or opportunities to purchase urban apartment units in markets with high 
barriers to access. Though this Note takes housing as its focus for reparations, 
“land-based reparations” was chosen over “housing-based reparations” in order 
to retain a clearer conceptual connection to land reform projects undertaken 
abroad and through history and to emphasize that these problems concern, at 
root, decisions about how people should live together in this nation, on this land. 
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inequality9 and our nation’s spiritual shortcomings borne of the 
lack of acknowledgment of the legacy of slavery after Reconstruc-
tion. 
This Note advances the legal reparations conversation by 
showing how land-based reparations could be constitutionally 
possible. This Note supplies a framework for a reviewing court 
to analyze land or housing-based reparations legislation. Such 
legislation would involve transfer of property from current own-
ers to beneficiaries of the reparations scheme. This would impli-
cate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against taking property 
for public use without just compensation, known as the Takings 
Clause.10 A “Taking” occurs when the government acquires pri-
vate property or otherwise ousts the owner or substantially in-
terferes with their use of the property.11 In other words, Takings 
are uses of the government’s eminent domain power. The Fifth 
Amendment poses an important limitation on the government’s 
ability to effectuate Takings: the Taking must be for a “public 
use.”12  
This Note focuses on public use objections to land-based rep-
arations schemes. The Supreme Court has construed the public 
use requirement leniently, tending to defer to the findings of the 
legislature pertaining to the problem to be solved.13 More strin-
gent conceptions of the public use requirement exist, however, 
such as a plain language reading of the word “public” and a more 
theoretical natural rights position such as that described by 
Richard Epstein. Epstein would pose the public use requirement 
of the Takings Clause as a challenge to demonstrate why the 
problem (in this case, the lack of African American intergenera-
tional wealth) should be the province of government intervention 
 
 9. Cf. Liz Krueger, Krueger Unveils Right-of-First Refusal Legislation to 
Protect Tenants, N.Y. ST. SENATOR LIZ KRUEGER (May 21, 2007), https://www 
.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/liz-krueger/krueger-unveils-right-first 
-refusal-legislation-protect-tenants [https://perma.cc/CM95-5FP9] (proposing 
that tenants who live in subsidized developments be given a right of first refusal 
when those developments are sold).  
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 11. Taking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 13. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 527 (Conn. 2004), 
aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (“[T]he courts’ role in reviewing a legislature’s judg-
ment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is 
equated with the police power[,] is extremely narrow.” (quotation omitted)). 
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and not the free market.14 The dissenting opinions in the Su-
preme Court’s 5–4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London hint at 
how these positions may increase in dominance over Takings ju-
risprudence in the coming years. This Note shows that Congress 
is capable of presenting findings and drafting land-based repa-
rations that would pass muster even under a Takings analysis 
more stringent than the current norm.  
The validity of authorization for the eminent domain power 
in reparations will require showing why authorizing eminent do-
main offers greater benefits than the government’s typical route 
of simply purchasing property on the free market for its land use 
projects. Of course, traditional sales without use of eminent do-
main remain a valid pathway for implementation, and Congress 
could author a bill that prioritizes traditional sales over actual 
use of the eminent domain power.15 Nonetheless, whether or not 
it is ultimately used, authorization for use of the eminent domain 
power in reparations would serve to bring “willing sellers” to the 
negotiating table in response to the unique demand that the gov-
ernment’s entrance into the market poses.16 Urban markets with 
high barriers to entry may be particularly desirable targets for 
meaningful reparations, and authorization for eminent domain 
could give the government a foot in the door to negotiate for ac-
quisition of urban rental units not currently offered for sale.17 
Many urban landscapes are also marked by a history of segrega-
tionist government policy, thus making a government remedy 
 
 14. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 177 (dismissing the case for the necessity 
of a rent-control statute as “weak, almost vanishing”). 
 15. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2018) (authorizing the Secretaries of the In-
terior and of Agriculture to acquire land “by purchase, exchange, donation, or 
eminent domain” for addition to the National Forest System, but providing “the 
Secretary may exercise the power of eminent domain only if necessary to secure 
access to public lands, and then only if the lands so acquired are confined to as 
narrow a corridor as is necessary”). 
 16. See United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 782 (5th Cir. 
1979) (“The Government has entered the ‘market’ as a ‘purchaser’ with a unique 
and pressing demand, and in so doing has distorted the market; absent the Gov-
ernment’s activity as ‘purchaser’ or condemnor, there would be no market re-
flecting this unique demand.”). 
 17. Cf. Ilyce Glink & Samuel J. Tamkin, How To Buy the Rental You’re Liv-
ing In, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
where-we-live/wp/2016/01/13/how-to-buy-the-rental-youre-living-in (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2020) (stipulating that “[t]he landlord is willing to sell” in an ex-
planation of purchasing a property listed as a rental property). 
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appropriate.18 While recognizing that there are good reasons not 
to resort to eminent domain proceedings unless necessary,19 this 
Note argues that the balance should be pushed slightly more to-
wards use of eminent domain than was represented in South Af-
rica’s program, for example.  
Part I of this Note takes both a historical and normative look 
at past and present reparations schemes and explains the public 
use question posed by the Takings Clause through cases like 
Kelo and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Part I also exam-
ines a contemporary example of land-based reparations cur-
rently the subject of international intrigue: South Africa has re-
cently accelerated its efforts to redistribute land to black South 
Africans stripped of their rights during apartheid. In South Af-
rica, the government’s pursuit of a “willing buyer, willing seller” 
policy instead of strong use of the eminent domain power has led 
to widespread frustration, culminating in Parliament-backed 
proposals to amend the constitution to eliminate the compensa-
tion requirement for land redistribution—a symptom of serious 
policy failure and unrest.  
Part II describes how a potential reparations act would meet 
a Takings jurisprudence that may be shifting away from a pos-
 
 18. For example, during the Great Depression, the Home Owners’ Loan Act 
of 1933 established an agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), 
which would offer loans and refinancing to home mortgagees in default. Home 
Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (1934) (repealed 1953). Agency offi-
cials created graded zones on city maps based explicitly on the degree of “infil-
tration of inharmonious racial groups” in the neighborhood and would refuse to 
lend in “red” zones. Introduction to Mapping Inequality, UNIV. OF RICH., https:// 
dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=3/41.238/-105.474&text=intro 
[https://perma.cc/EDH2-9ZC4] (citation omitted). Where the effects of a place’s 
history of expressly segregationist government policy are still being felt, the 
scope of the government’s constitutional authority arguably grows significantly. 
Remedying the effects of the government’s own past discriminatory policy has 
long been held to be within Congress’s power under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view there is only one circumstance in which the 
States may act by race to ‘undo the effects of past discrimination’: where that is 
necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial 
classification.” (emphasis in original)). 
 19. Eminent domain often strikes resentment into the hearts of individuals 
and communities losing their property. Accusations of inefficiency and unfair-
ness abound, weakening public trust in government. See, e.g., Jake Rossen, 7 
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ture of deference to the legislature toward a more stringent judi-
cial approach to the public use analysis. Part III argues that 
courts should retain their posture of deference to the legislature 
when considering a reparations act because legislatures, unlike 
courts, are uniquely positioned to evaluate non-economic, socio-
political goods that reparations can bring about. Part III then 
argues that even under a non-deferential paradigm, the failure 
of the free market to solve the problem of intergenerational Af-
rican American wealth can satisfy the public use requirement of 
the Takings Clause. Part III also looks to South Africa’s example 
to offer arguments as to why the public might gain from Con-
gressional authorization of eminent domain in a reparations bill, 
even if the government elects not to initiate eminent domain pro-
ceedings. Finally, Part III addresses slippery slope and tyranny 
of the majority objections to the recognition of reparations as a 
public use. Similar objections were raised by the petitioners and 
dissenting Justices in Kelo and would likely be raised again in 
this context. 
I.  CONCEPTUALIZING REPARATIONS WITHIN TAKINGS 
JURISPRUDENCE   
Reparations exist in an ambiguous legal, moral, and politi-
cal space between a traditional legal remedy between private 
parties and a democratic decision by the body politic about con-
ducting the affairs of today.20 Because human responses to in-
jury and oppression vary in scale and circumstance as widely as 
the injuries themselves, reparations must be defined as a sub-
set of potential remedies for the term to be useful. The definition 
of reparations matters not only for discourse, but for the political 
and social viability of reparations themselves: like most political 
action, reparations are born of demands made by organized so-
cial bodies and will succeed more often when the social group is 
clearly defined and can present a compelling account of how 
their injury has not been redressed by traditional remedies.21 
 
 20. See generally David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional 
Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1043 (2010) (framing reparations in temporal terms: reparations happen when 
nations transition from an abusive past into a commitment “to democracy, hu-
man rights, and the rule of law”). 
 21. See Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Getting to Reparations: Japanese 
Americans and African Americans, 83 SOC. FORCES 823, 824–25 (2004) (utiliz-
ing social movements theory to illuminate difficulties of successfully framing a 
claim for reparations for slavery). 
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For example, the conceptual clarity in South Africa about who 
was injured, how they were injured, and how the present remedy 
relates to that injury has allowed land redistribution to proceed 
with governmental and popular support. 
Section A explains basic normative concepts in reparations, 
focusing on Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s definition of rep-
arations and their taxonomy of core reparations relationships. 
Section B describes the Takings Clause and Takings jurispru-
dence generally, and Section C explains the public use require-
ment, focusing on Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Armed 
with these concepts, Section D examines South African land re-
form and the problems that have led to the proposed constitu-
tional amendment to eliminate the compensation requirement 
for Takings. Section E examines reparations in the United 
States, including those paid to Japanese Americans and the his-
tory of efforts toward reparations for slavery. 
A. DEFINING REPARATIONS AND THEIR CORE RELATIONSHIPS 
One of the paradoxes of American life is that many Ameri-
cans acknowledge that something very wrong happened in the 
formative years of this country, with pernicious effects lasting 
into the present, yet few Americans feel personally culpable 
enough that they are willing to voluntarily disgorge their as-
sets.22 White people feel a “moral taint” for slavery and its ef-
fects, a feeling of culpability despite not having individually en-
slaved anyone.23 The question of whether mere membership in a 
group (e.g. white or African American) can confer moral status 
as wrongdoer or victim24 takes on vital significance when consid-
ering one’s moral obligations within a landscape of inequality:25 
if a group can bear status as a wrongdoer, members of that group 
may be rational to feel guilt if the group has acted wrongly. Rep-
arations offer the opportunity to ease the collective sense of guilt 
 
 22. See, e.g., REPARATIONS, https://www.reparations.me (last visited Mar. 
11, 2020) (providing an online platform for white people to individually pay rep-
arations directly to people of color, listing 79 “offering” and 104 “satisfied”). 
 23. See generally Marina A. L. Oshana, Moral Taint, 37 METAPHILOSOPHY 
353 (2006) (describing the characteristics associated with moral taint and ex-
amining the feeling of moral culpability under vicarious liability and collective 
responsibility theories). 
 24. See, e.g., Stephen Winter, On the Possibilities of Group Injury, 37 
METAPHILOSOPHY 393 (2006). 
 25. See Lauren G. Robinson, Rationales for Rural Land Redistribution in 
South Africa, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 465, 490 (1997). 
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or blame in a society where victims and perpetrators and their 
descendants are required to live alongside one another.26 
There has been a lot written about such normative moral 
concepts regarding reparations, but there has been compara-
tively little legal scholarship about reparations.27 In 2003, Eric 
Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s Reparations for Slavery and 
Other Historical Injustices outlined core legal concepts for repa-
rations schemes, but gave only cursory treatment of land-based 
reparations.28 This Note takes up where Posner and Vermeule 
left off and uses their normative concepts to craft a framework 
for judicial review of land-based reparations legislation in the 
United States.  
As a preliminary definition, Posner and Vermeule offer four 
characteristics of reparations. Reparations (1) provide a pay-
ment to a large group of claimants; (2) for wrongs that were per-
missible under prevailing law when committed; (3) in which cur-
rent law bars a compulsory remedy for the past wrong (by virtue 
of sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, etc.); and (4) are 
justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, ra-
ther than forward-looking grounds such as the deterrence.29 
Contrary to (4), reparations have often been thought of as for-
ward-looking, though not because of deterrence. Reparations can 
increase domestic prosperity by providing some citizens greater 
means to participate in the economy30 or by fostering social 
 
 26. See Gray, supra note 20; Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of 
African-American Reparations to Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1689, 1689–90 (2002) (“[R]eparations can avoid [a] divisive outcome if pos-
ited . . . as a means to ‘repair’ a country by creating a sense of mutual, interra-
cial trust, respect, and shared destiny.”). 
 27. A substantial amount of the legal literature has focused on attempts at 
obtaining reparations through litigation. These attempts have almost univer-
sally failed. See, e.g., Yanessa L. Barnard, Note, Better Late than Never: A Tak-
ings Clause Solution to Reparations, 12 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 109, 
111–12 (2005). 
 28. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other 
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 700–01 (2003). 
 29. Id. at 691.  
 30. See WORLD BANK GROUP, AN INCOMPLETE TRANSITION: OVERCOMING 
THE LEGACY OF EXCLUSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 97 (2018), https://openknowledge 
.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29793/WBG-South-Africa-Systematic 
-Country-Diagnostic-FINAL-for-board-SECPO-Edit-05032018.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/D8LG-AUWT] (identifying that currently poor titling of property held 
by poor South Africans limits their use of property as collateral to access fi-
nance); Robinson, supra note 25, at 490. 
  
2020] PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS 2113 
 
bonds between demographics.31 It is nonetheless helpful to in-
clude (4) in a preliminary definition to distinguish reparations 
from endeavors made purely to increase economic prosperity, 
such as those generally within Congress’s power under the Com-
merce Clause.32 There is an irreducible element of a backwards-
looking corrective justice in reparations. 
Reparations deal in judgments about groups in a way that 
traditional legal remedies do not. In a traditional legal action, 
the injured party and the wrongdoer must be clearly and dis-
cretely defined for a remedy to be awarded and enforced.33 Pos-
ner and Vermeule observe that reparations involve a relaxation 
of the identification requirements of one or both parties.34 Mem-
bership in a class, rather than a showing of individualized cau-
sation, becomes enough to make a viable claim for reparations 
benefits. Posner and Vermeule warn that although relaxing the 
individual identity requirements makes claiming reparations 
easier, it also makes reparations politically less compelling be-
cause the mechanism of injury becomes less clear.35  
Any act of reparations requires an account of three sets of 
relationships, and the more detail and specificity that can be pro-
vided in these relationships, the better. Reparations schemes 
must articulate: (1) the relationship between the original wrong-
doer and original victim; (2) the relationship between the origi-
nal wrongdoer and the possible present payer of reparations; and 
(3) the relationship between the original victim and the possible 
present claimant or beneficiary.36 There has been much written 
on the empirical problems inherent in relationship (3), such as 
identifying descendants of slaves and questioning whether their 
moral claims for reparations might diminish as the genes tying 
them to the original victims are diluted.37 Such problems, while 
 
 31. See Note, supra note 26, at 1689–90. 
 32. E.g., Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185 § 101, 122 
Stat. 613, 613 (providing a one-time income tax rebate for tax filers issued in 
mid-2008). 
 33. See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 
992, 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussing and implementing an implied “ascertaina-
bility” requirement for class certification). 
 34. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 691. 
 35. Id. at 699. 
 36. Id. at 698. 
 37. See Note, supra note 26, at 1697–1700; see also Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 28, at 718 (stating that reparations beneficiaries and payers share a 
mutual motivation to monitor the accuracy of benefits claims: beneficiaries 
know that payers do not want their payments being taken by free riders and 
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important for the political viability and practical implementa-
tion of reparations, are not the subject of this Note.  
Cash-based reparations paid out of the general treasury can 
circumvent the need to articulate the relationship between the 
original wrongdoer and the payer in two ways. First, if the gov-
ernment itself authorized or perpetrated the wrongdoing, then 
making the government qua government pay is an easy pill to 
swallow.38 Second, even where the government is not conceived 
of as the primary wrongdoer, the government qua taxpayer is an 
acceptable vehicle for reparations because the tax burden on any 
individual payer becomes so low as to be negligible and because 
taxpayers generally lack standing to sue over tax grievances.39 
Land-based reparations would be considerably more complex be-
cause some landowner would be required to give something up, 
subjecting the act to challenge under the Takings Clause.  
B. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifth Amendment ends with the Takings Clause, which 
states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”40 In other words, when the government 
enacts legislation which requires that someone surrender prop-
erty, the government is not only required to pay the owner for its 
value, but is also required to show that the property will be put 
to “public use.” The Takings Clause is an important statement 
of the government’s relationship to private property and individ-
ual rights, and scholars debate over its nature and scope.41  
A cash-based reparations scheme where beneficiaries are 
paid out of the general treasury would not implicate the Takings 
Clause because no one, no payer of the reparations, would lose 
any property beyond the taxes paid into the general treasury, 
and the government’s ability to tax and spend for the general 
welfare is beyond question.42 Nor would land-based reparations 
 
understand that monitoring recipients safeguards the political and moral au-
thority of the reparations scheme). 
 38. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 467. 
 39. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 714. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 41. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: 
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1668–
70 (1988) (questioning whether the “liberal triad” of property rights—exclusive 
use, control, and disposition—can be found “in” the Constitution, as Richard 
Epstein argues). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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where Congress has not authorized use of the eminent domain 
power, such as a purely grant-based model or a program of land 
acquisition through voluntary sales to the government. If Con-
gress does authorize use of the eminent domain power, the con-
stitutionality of the reparations legislation could be challenged 
by the landowner in an eminent domain proceeding.43 The Tak-
ings Clause, as a restriction on government power, is facially 
more demanding of the legislature than the Taxing and Spend-
ing Clause, an affirmative grant of power.44 
A challenge to government action under the Takings Clause 
invites three questions: first, whether there was a Taking at 
all;45 second, whether the Taking was for a legitimate public 
use;46 third, whether just compensation was paid.47 The first and 
third can be briefly introduced, while the second is a subject of 
primary concern for this Note. On the first, in cases where some-
one loses possession of their land or property, it is clear that a 
Taking occurred.48 This would be the result of an act of land-
based reparations, where the beneficiaries would take control. 
Less clear, but of key importance in areas such as environmental 
regulation, are cases where the landowner argues that regula-
tions, not eminent domain, have interfered with the owner’s use 
and enjoyment of the property such that the regulation rises to 
the level of a Taking (called a “regulatory Taking”), even though 
 
 43. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Cty. of Lawrence, 437 F. App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 44. In other words, the Takings Clause does not itself provide the federal 
government with the constitutional basis for an action. A federal use of the em-
inent domain power must fall within one of the enumerated powers of Congress, 
such as the Commerce Clause, and then additionally satisfy the requirements 
of the Takings Clause. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall 
have the power . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 45. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265–66 (1946) (finding that 
frequent low-flying military airplanes over private residential property were 
“an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full en-
joyment of the property” and holding that this intrusion constituted a Taking 
requiring compensation). 
 46. E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 47. E.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 370, 373 (1943). 
 48. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430, 
441 (1982) (holding that the mandated installation of a cable box on private 
residential property constituted a Taking because it deprived the owner of use 
of that part of their property). 
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the owner’s exclusive possession is not compromised.49 On the 
third question, just compensation is typically measured by the 
market value of the property at the time of the Taking.50 The 
following section discusses the second question: whether the 
Taking was for a public use. 
C. THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT AND LEGISLATIVE 
DEFERENCE 
The question of what constitutes a valid public use depends, 
at root, upon fundamental concepts about the state’s role in 
providing for individuals.51 While the magnitude of that question 
may mean that the public use requirement will never be pre-
cisely defined,52 there are some generally agreed-upon end-
points. On one end, it is clear that where the property will be 
used by the public itself, as in a highway or other infrastructure, 
the public use requirement is satisfied.53 The idea is to prevent 
the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”54 On the other end, a Taking meant merely 
to enrich a private party, or where the stated public use is found 
 
 49. Regulatory Taking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The 
landmark case concerning regulatory Takings is Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, which held that a Taking occurs when a regulation leaves the 
property owner without any available economic use of the property. 505 U.S. 
1003, 1019 (1992); see also James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of 
Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 497, 497 (1993) (“Many 
believe that the Lucas decision reflects the broader goals of the Reagan-Bush 
era. It shifts the analytical focus in environmental takings jurisprudence to a 
more owner-oriented analysis, in line with the general perception that the high 
court is weighted with ‘pro-property’ justices.” (citations omitted)). 
 50. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015). 
 51. See generally Property and Ownership, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 6, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/#Bib 
[https://perma.cc/9ZQK-GCXA] (describing three species of potential societal 
property arrangements—common property, collective property, and private 
property—and summarizing normative arguments for private property as an 
institution). 
 52. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“An attempt to define its 
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless . . . .”). 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn., 
821 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2016) (treating the condemnation of a strip of land 
by the Tennessee Valley Authority for the installation of power lines as a Tak-
ing). 
 54. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
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to be a mere pretext for private enrichment, is prohibited by the 
public use requirement.55 A land-based reparations scheme 
would place taken property into private hands,56 so the constitu-
tionality of this Taking under the public use requirement must 
be considered. 
Not all legislation where taken property ends up in private 
hands is invalid under the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court 
has “repeatedly and consistently rejected” a definition of public 
use as restricted only to “use by the public.”57 Writing for the 
majority in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Stevens helpfully 
explains the poles of the public use requirement, which high-
lights the grey area in which this debate occurs: 
Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long 
been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the 
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though 
A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that 
a State may transfer property from one private party to another if fu-
ture “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation 
of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar exam-
ple.58 
Between these poles lies the grey area of Takings jurispru-
dence. Where a piece of legislation places property into private 
hands, yet the private recipient owes no duty to the public, courts 
must puzzle over whether the Taking satisfies the public use re-
quirement.  
Though the question may seem initially vexing, jurispru-
dence on the public use requirement shows that courts have of-
ten deferred to the legislature’s findings on the issue, circum-
venting direct consideration of the question.59 Because the 
legislature is more in touch with the needs of the public than the 
judiciary, the Supreme Court has stated that “the role of the ju-
diciary in determining whether [legislative] power is being exer-
cised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”60 In Clark 
v. Nash, the Supreme Court upheld the widening of an irrigation 
ditch as a valid public use although only one individual farmer 
benefited from it.61 In Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld a Dis-
 
 55. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. at 479–80. 
 58. Id. at 477. 
 59. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 363–65 (1905). 
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trict of Columbia plan to redevelop “blighted” urban areas by de-
scribing the public use requirement in terms of the general police 
power, which they described as “spiritual as well as physical, 
aesthetic as well as monetary.”62  
Most pertinent to an inquiry about reparations and the gov-
ernment’s ability to provide housing for individuals, however, is 
the case of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Midkiff is in-
teresting because the problem that the Hawaii legislature 
solved, though historically unique, bears some resemblance to 
the problem facing African American intergenerational wealth. 
Before the arrival of American settlers in Hawaii, the Polynesian 
people there managed land using a feudal tenure system in 
which one island high chief, the ali’i nui, held ultimate control 
of all the island land and managed it through a system of hier-
archal delegation.63 After decades of interaction between Hawai-
ian leaders and American settlers, the land in Hawaii remained 
within the hands of the few.64 The Hawaii legislature found that 
the State and Federal Governments owned 49% of the land and 
that 47% was held by only seventy-two private landowners.65 
The Hawaii state legislature found this injurious to the residen-
tial fee simple market and to public tranquility as a whole.66  
The remedy which best accommodated lessors and lessees 
was the Land Reform Act of 1967.67 Under the Act, tenants living 
on single-family residential lots within developmental tracts 
could ask the Hawaii Housing Authority to condemn the prop-
erty.68 When a minimum percentage of tenants in a development 
filed the appropriate application, the Housing Authority would 
hold a public hearing on whether condemnation of the land 
would “effectuate the public purposes of the Act.”69 If condemna-
tion was warranted, a purchase price was set either by condem-
nation trial or negotiation between the Housing Authority and 
 
 62. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29, 33. 
 63. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 233. One of the landowners’ chief complaints was the federal tax 
liability they would incur by selling their land. Because transfers under the 
Act’s condemnation scheme were involuntary, the federal tax burden on the 
landowners was reduced. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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the lessor.70 After condemnation and acquisition by the Housing 
Authority, the Housing Authority would sell the parcels to ten-
ants.71 Of note, funds to satisfy the condemnation awards were 
supplied entirely by the lessees.72 
Citing Berman v. Parker, the Court first reiterated that the 
legislature’s voice is “well-nigh conclusive” when it comes to de-
claring what is in the public interest.73 The Court will not inval-
idate the legislature’s judgment as to whether a public use is be-
ing effectuated unless the legislature’s judgment is “palpably 
without reasonable foundation.”74 Applying these principles to 
the facts, the Court stated that the land oligopoly facing the peo-
ple of Hawaii, which was “traceable to their monarchs,” impeded 
the normal functioning of the residential land market, forcing 
thousands of residents to lease rather than purchase their 
homes.75 The Court held that “[r]egulating oligopoly and the 
evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police 
powers,” and found that the Act was rationally related to its ob-
jective.76 In other words, the deferential approach is rational ba-
sis review.77  
D. CASE STUDY: LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
South Africa is vigorously pursuing a solution to the lack of 
black landownership.78 South Africa’s constitution also contains 
a “Takings Clause,” called the Property Clause, which contains 
more express language on the public use requirement than the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides.79 The South 
 
 70. Id. at 234. 
 71. Id. The Housing Authority could also sell the parcel to another party, 
provided public notice was given. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 239. 
 74. Id. at 241 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 
680 (1896)). 
 75. Id. at 242.  
 76. Id. at 242–44 (noting that “it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its 
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause”). 
 77. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) 
(applying rational basis review and stating that “the law need not be in every 
respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that 
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it”). 
 78. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Ch. 2 § 25. 
 79. Id.  
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African constitution also expressly recognizes land redistribu-
tion as a goal to be attained.80 Despite the presence of these con-
stitutional provisions for the past twenty-two years, public sat-
isfaction with the rate and execution of land reform has been low 
enough to create demand for accelerated efforts. In 2016, Presi-
dent Jacob Zuma backed a proposed amendment to the constitu-
tion allowing redistribution of land without compensation, which 
has received continuing support from President Cyril Rama-
phosa through fall 2019.81 
In South Africa, the contours of the core reparations rela-
tionships are highly visible and subject to public debate.82 The 
history of apartheid in South Africa allows for a strong showing 
in terms of Posner and Vermeule’s three reparations relation-
ships, fueling widespread political support for land reform.83 The 
recognition of a property-based remedy as appropriate for what 
was, in part, a property-based injury,84 garnered popular sup-
port for the endeavor.85 The stark racial terms of the legislation 
which originally severed black South Africans from their land 
allows for a coherent narrative connecting the original victims to 
contemporary beneficiaries. The 1913 Natives Land Act prohib-
ited black ownership of land outside a reserve area constituting 
 
 80. Id. § 25(4). 
 81. See David Brennan, South Africa Plows On with Land Seizure Reform, 
Drops Bill Offering Compensation, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www 
.newsweek.com/south-africa-withdraws-land-seizure-bill-1093158 [https:// 
perma.cc/7UYM-K2JX]; Matthew Savides, ‘We Are a Great People,’ Says Rama-




 82. See SAM MOYO, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., THE 
POLITICS OF LAND DISTRIBUTION AND RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
12 (Dec. 2004). 
 83. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 698. 
 84. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Ch. 2 § 25(3)(b) (including “the history of the 
acquisition and use of the property” among “all relevant circumstances” used to 
evaluate the “equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected”). 
 85. Cf. Olivia Lannegren & Hiroshi Ito, The End of the ANC Era: An Anal-
ysis of Corruption and Inequality in South Africa, 10 J. POL. & L. 55, 57 (2017) 
(arguing that Mandela’s party, the African National Congress, received in 2016 
the lowest amount of votes it had ever received since Mandela assumed power 
in 1994 in part because inequality remains as bad or worse as it was in Man-
dela’s time). 
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seven percent of South Africa and prohibited other land transac-
tions, including sharecropping, between black and non-black 
persons outside the reserve.86 The Population Registration Act 
of 1950 created racial categories and a subsequent series of stat-
utes that regulates many areas of life including education, com-
merce, and residence for these categories.87 Apartheid furthered 
segregation in the 1960s through 1980s.88 
The ending of apartheid in 1994 and the presidency of Nel-
son Mandela held the promise that inequality would be reduced 
and black South Africans would gain more wealth.89 Constitu-
tional reforms that reflected those values soon followed. South 
Africa’s 1996 constitution provides, like the United States, that 
in general property may only be expropriated for a public pur-
pose and subject to payment consented to or approved by a 
court.90 Unlike the United States, South Africa’s constitution ex-
pressly provides that the amount of compensation takes into ac-
count “the history of the acquisition and use of the property,” and 
that “the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to 
land reform. . . . The state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to foster condi-
tions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis.”91 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 established an 
agency, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, to allo-
cate expropriated land back to black South Africans who quali-
fied as claimants.92 Under the Act, a South African was entitled 
to restitution if they were “persons or [part of] communities 
[who] were disposed under or for the purpose of furthering the 
objects of any racially based discriminatory law,” or were the de-
ceased estate or direct descendent of such a person.93 After the 
 
 86. Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 § 1(1)–(2) (S. Afr.) (repealed 1991); see also 
Robinson, supra note 25, at 472–73. 
 87. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 § 5(1) (S. Afr.) (repealed 1991) 
(“Every person . . . shall be classified by the Director as a white person, a col-
oured person or a native.”). 
 88. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 476 (“Apartheid represented a culmina-
tion of South Africa’s segregationist policies as opposed to a break in its his-
tory.”). 
 89. See Lannegren & Ito, supra note 85, at 57. 
 90. S. AFR. CONST., 1966, Ch. 2 § 25(1)–(2). 
 91. Id. § (3)–(5).  
 92. Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 § 4 (S. Afr.). 
 93. See id. § 2. 
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Commission found such a showing satisfied, a notice was pub-
lished and given to the owners of the parcel of land referred to in 
the claim, who were thereby enjoined from conveying the land or 
substantially altering it unless express permission from the 
Commission was obtained.94 The Act also created a Land Claims 
Court which would receive claims approved by the Commission 
and which the Commission was unable to resolve through medi-
ation.95 The Land Claims Court could determine claimants’ 
rights to restitution, to compensation, and to determine whether 
previously obtained consideration for the land was adequate.96 
In 1997, the Department of Land Affairs drafted and distrib-
uted the White Paper on South African Land Policy.97 This Paper 
outlined the Department’s “willing seller, willing buyer” policy 
of land redistribution, phrased with explicit reference to the 
Property Clause and the tension between respecting existing 
landowners while moving forward with claims.98 Under the will-
ing seller, willing buyer policy, the Department stated that “[a] 
programme of forced land titling will not be undertaken.”99 The 
role of the Department was not to “become directly involved in 
land purchase for the land redistribution programme,” but to 
“provide grants and services to assist the needy with the pur-
chase of land.”100 
The willing buyer, willing seller policy failed to satisfy most 
South Africans.101 In 2018, black South Africans still only owned 
four percent of land in South Africa.102 Beneficiary claimants 
complained of “unhelpful, rude, and dismissive” officials contrib-
uting to “long delays, constantly changing qualification require-
 
 94. Id. § 11. 
 95. Id. §§ 14, 22. 
 96. Id. § 22. 
 97. DEP’T. OF LAND AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN LAND POL-
ICY (1997). 
 98. Id. at 5, 39–40. 
 99. Id. at 16. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Constitutional Review Commission, Video: Free State Public Hearing, 
Part 1, at 38:30, YOUTUBE (2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
sKS0MKmAQGE. 
 102. Witney Schneidman & Landry Signé, South Africa: Land Redistribu-
tion in South Africa, Trump’s Tweet, and U.S.-Africa Policy, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 
29, 2018), https://allafrica.com/stories/201808290650.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9URP-P2K4]. 
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ments and ‘strategic partners’ being imposed on them as a con-
dition of getting land.”103 Corruption is also a concern: in 2019 
South Africa’s Special Investigative Unit uncovered a network of 
fraud wherein payments were made to beneficiaries and farms 
which did not meet the requisite criteria.104 
Many claimants who have received land face serious chal-
lenges making productive use of it. A 2016 report commissioned 
by Parliament examined empirical studies that investigated the 
use and productivity of redistributed land and found in all pro-
vincial studies that less than 50% of land reform projects were 
growing food and marketing it effectively.105 Lack of infrastruc-
ture and equipment, the reality that many claimants are inex-
perienced in working the land, and scarcity of capital to invest 
in these projects together result in stagnation and beneficiaries 
lose interest in the project.106 Successful projects on claimed land 
are often either large group endeavors engaging in commercial 
farming or household-level projects where the applicants are al-
ready wealthy enough to invest in resources for the project.107 
The report cites, inter alia, lack of post-settlement support and 
poor political leadership as major factors in the failure of land 
reform and concludes that “South Africa’s land reform has com-
bined the least effective aspects of both state and market-driven 
approaches.”108 
The National Assembly, one of two chambers of the legisla-
tive branch (together called the Parliament) passed a motion in 
February 2018 that stated that the House “[r]ecognizes that the 
 
 103. REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THE ASSESSMENT OF KEY LEG-
ISLATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 203 (2017), 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_ 
Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN9V-5UFF]. 
 104. See Tom Head, The Great Land Reform Heist: Report Accuses Govern-
ment Officials of “Enormous” Fraud, SOUTH AFRICAN (Jan. 24, 2019), https:// 
www.thesouthafrican.com/land-reform-corruption-fraud-report/ [https://perma 
.cc/4K4F-3WVX]. 
 105. INST. FOR POVERTY, LAND & AGRARIAN STUDIES, UNIV. OF THE WEST-
ERN CAPE, DIAGNOSTIC REPORT ON LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 27 (2016), 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_ 
Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_ 
Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3FR-AB3H] (finding in one 
study that “[o]nly 42% of projects were producing effectively and marketing 
their produce,” and in another study that “for 40%, at least some beneficiary 
activity . . . was discernible.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 28. 
 108. Id. at 79–80. 
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current policy instruments, including the willing buyer willing 
seller policy, and other provisions of section 25 of the Constitu-
tion may be hindering effective land reform” and instructed the 
Constitutional Review Committee to “review . . . section 25 of 
the Constitution . . . about the necessity of, and mechanisms for 
expropriating land without compensation” and propose “the nec-
essary constitutional amendments[.]”109 In December 2018 both 
chambers of Parliament resolved to adopt the report of the Con-
stitutional Review Committee, signaling that the Parliament 
was receptive for a constitutional amendment bill to be 
brought.110 On December 21, 2018, the South African Govern-
ment Gazette published a draft expropriation bill for public com-
ment,111 and revisions continued through 2019 until the most re-
cent draft, for which the comment period closed on January 31, 
2020.112 As expected, the draft bill states that “nil compensation” 
may be paid “where land is expropriated in the public interest, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances.”113 
Recent land reform efforts and the possibility of expropria-
tion without compensation draw international scrutiny. Some 
fear that investors will lose confidence in South Africa if a con-
stitutional amendment undermines the security of property 
 
 109. Motion as adopted with amendments by National Assembly. MINUTES 
OF REPORTS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NO. 3, 5TH PARLIAMENT, AT 6 (S. Afr.), 
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180320motion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68LF-MZ2U].  
 110. Parliament Approves Recommendation To Amend Section 25 of Consti-
tution, SOUTH AFR. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.gov.za/speeches/ncop-approves 
-recommendation-amend-section-25-constitution-5-dec-2018-0000 [https:// 
perma.cc/6VY3-LU65]. In spring 2019, legislators stated that there would be no 
vote or action on an amendment until the next Parliament was elected. Jan 
Gerber, Land: Section 25 Amendment Won’t Be Passed Before Elections, MPs 
Agree, NEWS24 (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ 
land-section-25-amendment-wont-be-passed-before-elections-mps-agree 
-20190313 [https://perma.cc/NTX3-LZ4Y]. 
 111. Draft Expropriations Bill 2019, GN 1409 of GG 42127 (21 Dec. 2018) (S. 
Afr.), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201812/ 
42127gon1409s.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9XB-6B2J]. 
 112. Jenna Ethridge & Jan Gerber, South Africa: Expropriation Without 
Compensation - Have Your Say On the Draft Bill, ALLAFRICA (Dec. 7, 2019), 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201912091052.html [https://perma.cc/R4WZ 
-VTU6]. 
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rights at large.114 Some critics draw parallels to land reform ef-
forts in Zimbabwe, which were criticized for use of violence and 
for leaving the country with ineffectively run farms.115 In August 
2018, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted that land reform in 
South Africa was exposing white farmers to violence there.116 
Although there has been some violence, it predates the recent 
land reform efforts, and its scale is often exaggerated.117 The 
U.S. Department of State, furthermore, has distinguished South 
Africa from Zimbabwe, noting that in Zimbabwe the independ-
ent judiciary was destroyed in a way that has not occurred in 
South Africa.118 
South Africa’s land reform efforts illustrate on a grand scale 
the social and logistical problems that face land-based repara-
tions attempts. It also serves as an example of how constitu-
tions—both constitutional permission for government eminent 
domain power as well as constitutional limitations on that 
 
 114. South Africa’s Banks Speak Out on Concerns Surrounding Land Re-
form, BUSINESSTECH (Aug. 31, 2018), https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/ 
268555/south-africas-banks-speak-out-on-concerns-surrounding-land-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/JCP7-GU7C]. 
 115. See, e.g., Tessa Clara Walther, Land Reform: Will Zimbabwe’s Eco-
nomic Downfall Be Repeated in South Africa?, DW (Dec. 30, 2017), https:// 
p.dw.com/p/2q6pl [https://perma.cc/5CJS-Q5CF]; see also Robert Mugabe Ad-
mits Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Flaws, BBC (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www 
.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31663267 [https://perma.cc/2C4J-YTMA]. South Af-
rican President Cyril Ramaphosa has denounced Zimbabwe’s land reform meth-
ods as “anarchy” and declared that “there will be no smash and grab in South 
Africa.” Joe Wallen, Farmers in South Africa Claim They Are Being Targeted in 




 116. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 22, 2018), https:// 
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1032454567152246785 [https://perma.cc/ 
BGE4-TPS]. But see Matt Peterson, Trump Believes Fox News—And South Af-
rica Pays the Price, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2018/08/trump-rule-of-law-south-africa-farmers/568390/ 
[https://perma.cc/HS25-S8BD]. 
 117. Fact Check: Were 400 White South African Farmers Murdered Last 
Year? ABC, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-05/fact-check-were-400 
-white-south-african-farmers-murdered-year/9591724 [https://perma.cc/E3FX 
-9569]. 
 118. Department Press Release – August 23, 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 
23, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/08/285362 
.htm#SOUTHAFRICA [https://perma.cc/PF9G-DTS8]. 
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power—balance the interests of groups that have opposing vi-
sions for property and land use. More generally, South Africa ex-
emplifies the interconnectedness of individual rights, state pow-
ers, and popular visions of social progress.119 While South 
Africa’s history and population differs greatly from that of the 
United States, there are lessons for courts to learn from South 
Africa’s land reform efforts so far should Congress undertake 
any form of land-based reparations in the United States. 
E. REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Starting from nothing, freed slaves in the United States ex-
ponentially increased their wealth and property holdings follow-
ing Emancipation and the passage of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment: in Georgia in 1880, whites owned thirty-six times more 
property than African Americans, which decreased to sixteen 
times by 1910.120 Yet, just as much as these figures show pro-
gress, they also highlight the magnitude of the initial gap and 
its persistence into the present. Black Americans generally ex-
perience greater poverty than white Americans, and this ine-
quality is heightened in areas in the South where there is a 
stronger historical connection to slavery.121 
Reconstruction contained great debate over how best to 
meet the needs of freed African Americans, which required ar-
ticulating how the federal government could act to meet the va-
riety of these needs while remaining within the constitutional 
bounds.122 The response was the Freedmen’s Bureau and the 
promise of “forty acres and a mule” for freed African Ameri-
cans.123 Specifically, the agency had the authority to “set apart, 
for the use of loyal refugees and freedmen, such tracts of land 
within the insurrectionary states as shall have been abandoned, 
 
 119. See Jan Gerber, Land: Amending Section 25 a ‘Great Moment in South 




 120. Bruce Sacerdote, Slavery and the Intergenerational Transmission of 
Human Capital, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 217, 219 (2005). 
 121. Heather A. O’Connell, The Impact of Slavery on Racial Inequality in 
Poverty in the Contemporary U.S. South, 90 SOC. FORCES 713, 728 (2012). 
 122. See John M. Bickers, The Power To Do What Manifestly Must Be Done: 
Congress, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and Constitutional Imagination, 12 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 70, 74–76 (2006). 
 123. An Act To Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, 
ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865). 
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or to which the United States shall have acquired title by confis-
cation or sale, or otherwise.”124 However, President Johnson 
granted amnesty to white Southerners and fully restored their 
property rights, which virtually eliminated the reserve of land 
for African Americans, the end result being that no land was con-
veyed under this program.125  
Several pushes for reparations for slavery have occurred 
since Reconstruction,126 including several efforts to obtain rem-
edies through litigation.127 One such effort in the 1980s, which 
included introduction of a bill to establish a Commission to 
Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans,128 carried 
momentum from two other movements. The first, a quasi-repa-
rations scheme,129 was a $122 million payment to Native Amer-
icans whose lands had been illegally seized in 1877.130 The sec-
ond was the legislation passed to provide reparations to 
Japanese Americans interned during World War II.131 The Civil 
 
 124. Id.  
 125. See Bickers, supra note 122, at 96–97 (noting that Congressmembers 
argued that land in the South could not be treated in the manner typical of one 
nation victorious in war over another because the Confederacy was not a sover-
eign entity, but rather an illegal organization incapable of altering title to land 
within its domain, the end result being that white landowners assumed the 
same ownership they did before after Johnson’s grant of amnesty); see also 
OUBRE, supra note 4. 
 126. See generally Reparations for Slavery Reading, CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/brown-v-board-50th-anniversary/ 
reparations-for-slavery-reading.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (discussing an 
1894 bill to provide both a one-time and recurring payments, which died in com-
mittee, as well as public demands from student groups and black nationalist 
groups such as the Black Panther Party, which were inspired by these success-
ful reparations acts). 
 127. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995) (dis-
missing claims for slavery injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the 
Civil Rights Act for lack of standing and because the government has not waived 
sovereign immunity). 
 128. Commission To Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, 
H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989). 
 129. Because the payment was premised on the illegality of the 1877 actions, 
it is different than a “true” reparations claim based on acts that were legal at 
the time of their commission. 
 130. See Reparations for Slavery Reading, supra note 126.  
 131. See generally Amy D. Coughenour, Reparations for Past Mistakes: Aton-
ing for the Internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, 37 DTTP 32 
(2009) (describing the several Acts under which the reparations scheme was 
passed and amended). 
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Liberties Act of 1988 provided $20,000 to each Japanese Ameri-
can held at an internment camp or their descendants, stipulat-
ing that the Attorney General shall identify and locate all such 
individuals without application, though individuals could give 
notice to the Attorney General.132 The reparations legislation 
survived an Equal Protection challenge from a German Ameri-
can plaintiff who had also been interned during the War.133 
Had freed African Americans been given forty acres and a 
mule, their levels of wealth would be closer to whites, both im-
mediately and intergenerationally.134 The unique historical ex-
ample of the Cherokee Nation, an autonomous tribal state dur-
ing and after the Civil War, offers a rare opportunity for 
statistical comparison into what the long-term effects of land-
based reparations might have been. Freed slaves in the Chero-
kee Nation gained citizenship status equal to that of native 
Cherokees.135 In the Cherokee Nation, all citizens had a right to 
claim and improve unused land, so many freed slaves farming 
elected to improve their own plots instead of sharecropping.136 
These African American farmers and their descendants were 
thirty-five percent more likely to own a home in 1900 than their 
counterparts in other Southern states.137  
The failures of Reconstruction carried the problem of Afri-
can American wealth into the twentieth century. Discriminatory 
practices regarding land and housing, such as using predatory 
and scare tactics to coerce black homeowners in poor neighbor-
hoods to sell low,138 and racially restrictive covenants on proper-
ties and in neighborhoods that kept black people from owning 
 
 132. 50 U.S.C. § 4215(1)–(2) (1989). 
 133. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that repara-
tions for Japanese Americans required strict scrutiny analysis but survived that 
analysis when German American plaintiff who was also interned during WWII 
sued); see also Note, supra note 26, 1694–96. 
 134. See generally George Sher, Transgenerational Compensation, 33 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 181 (2005) (discussing the “counterfactual” problem to intergener-
ational injury: even though present day recipients of compensation may not 
have even existed but for the injury itself, they are still owed compensation for 
later wrongs connected to the original wrongs). 
 135. Melinda C. Miller, Land and Racial Wealth Inequality, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 371, 371–72 (2011). 
 136. Id. at 373–74 (reporting that the median black farmer in the Cherokee 
Nation owned twenty-eight more acres of land than the median black farmer in 
the South). 
 137. Id. at 374–75. 
 138. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (2014) https:// 
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property, have been shown to have a strong geographical corre-
lation with present day poverty and inequality of wealth and 
homeownership.139 Americans have grown to care more about in-
equality in the last ten years.140 Tracing the impacts of racial 
discrimination in finance and housing, Ta-Nehisi Coates’ 2014 
landmark piece The Case for Reparations rearticulated repara-
tions to a contemporary audience at the height of the Black Lives 
Matter movement.141 In 2017, Representative John Conyers in-
troduced H.R. 40 (a reference to the forty acres and a mule orig-
inally promised), a bill which would establish a federal commis-
sion to study and propose reparations remedies for African 
Americans.142  
The Democratic primary brought reparations into the public 
sphere in 2019, where some candidates supported reparations 
for African Americans while others supported broader, poten-




 139. See generally MAPPING PREJUDICE, https://www.mappingprejudice.org 
[https://perma.cc/WK8Q-GVR5] (documenting discriminatory housing prac-
tices).  
 140. See Peter W. Atwater, Interest in Income Inequality: U.S. Case Study, 
WORLD POL’Y (May 26, 2014), https://worldpolicy.org/2014/05/26/interest-in 
-income-inequality-u-s-case-study/ [https://perma.cc/VA98-6LEM]; see also Ine-
quality, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2008 
-02-01%202014-02-15&geo=US&q=income%20inequality (last visited Mar. 11, 
2020). 
 141. Coates, supra note 138. 
 142. Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-
Americans Act, H.R. 40, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 143. In February 2019, Senator Kamala Harris, while a candidate for the 
Democratic party nomination for the 2020 Presidential race, stated on a radio 
broadcast that she supported reparations for slavery. Astead W. Herndon, 2020 
Democrats Embrace Race-Conscious Policies, Including Reparations, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/politics/2020 
-democrats-race-policy.html [https://perma.cc/W9V4-9HQC]. Senator Elizabeth 
Warren, while a Democratic candidate, also stated her support for reparations 
and has proposed including Native Americans in the initiative, whereas Senator 
and candidate Bernie Sanders opposed reparations and instead voiced support 
for race-neutral legislation to uplift distressed communities. Igor Derysh, Ber-
nie Sanders Dismisses Kamala Harris’ and Elizabeth Warren’s Calls for Slavery 
Reparations, SALON (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/28/bernie 
-sanders-dismisses-kamala-harris-and-elizabeth-warrens-calls-for-slavery 
-reparations/ [https://perma.cc/3LNF-GD8Z]; Annie Linskey, Elizabeth Warren 
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the practicability and desirability of reparations.144 A substan-
tive reparations bill, brought via H.R. 40’s Commission or other-
wise, could make its way to the judiciary in the not-too-distant 
future.  
There are possibilities for contemporary reparations involv-
ing property or homeownership which could creatively solve both 
the intergenerational wealth problem and the social problems 
regarding race relations. African Americans rent homes rather 
than own them at higher rates than whites, and black homeown-
ers have been leaving their homes for the rental market at 
higher rates than whites.145 As the percentage of people who rent 
rather than own their homes has increased generally,146 a 
broader renters’ rights movement has found natural allies in or-
ganizations that advocate for communities of color and has iden-
tified solutions such as community land trusts and co-ops.147 A 




 144. Compare Megan McArdle, Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren Are 




[https://perma.cc/RJ48-FGBR] (opposing reparations because reparations bene-
fits would trivialize the injustice of slavery and would operate as a “psychologi-
cal quitclaim” severing the government from its sense of responsibility for its 
disadvantaged groups), with Bill Fogarty, The True Range of Opportunities for 
Reparations, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/the-true-range-of-opportunities-for-reparations/2019/03/03/fec269d0 
-3ba1-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html?utm_term=.72e3ab2b1a31 [https:// 
perma.cc/FT8F-AZSM] (stating that contemporary critics of reparations 
“dodg[e] the issue of reparations” by failing to consider the full range of options 
available, including “easy” ones such as getting rid of Confederate monuments).  
 145. See Gregory Sharp & Matthew Hall, Emerging Forms of Racial Inequal-
ity in Homeownership Exit, 1968–2009, 61 SOC. PROBS. 427, 435 (2014). 
 146. Anthony Cilluffo et al., More U.S. Households Are Renting Than at Any 
Point in 50 Years, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 19, 2017), https://www 
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/19/more-u-s-households-are-renting-than 
-at-any-point-in-50-years (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
 147. See, e.g., CAL. RENTER POWER, https://carenterpower.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/J8UT-NUX8] (“Our collective work for housing justice is 
grounded in the principles of racial, economic, and gender justice. We believe an 
injury to one is an injury to all. We believe housing is a human right. We believe 
to make that a reality we must build the power of tenants and low-income people 
to shape their communities.”). 
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ship of property that beneficiaries are already living in, for ex-
ample. Reparations beneficiaries could go to the government for 
help negotiating the purchase of certain properties, where the 
government’s authorization to use eminent domain would help a 
beneficiary penetrate the market, even if eminent domain is not 
ultimately used. Other options for land-based reparations may 
be option contracts or rights of first refusal for property already 
being sold.148 Land-based reparations, and the subsequent Tak-
ings Clause analysis they would provoke, could well be part of 
the reparations conversation in the coming decade. 
II.  ANTICIPATING THE JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF A 
LAND-BASED REPARATIONS BILL   
 If a reparations bill is passed by Congress in any form, it 
will undoubtedly be the product of intense public debate and of 
much private reckoning with our individual relationships to in-
stitutions created within a history that includes slavery.149 A 
property or land-based reparations bill would elicit even more 
powerful response than cash-based reparations or government-
funded education and public works programs150 designed as rep-
arations remedies. The recent events in South Africa, including 
the proposed amendment to eliminate the just compensation re-
quirement, underscore the need to take land reform demands se-
 
 148. Cf. Krueger, supra note 9 (proposing that tenants who live in subsidized 
developments be given a right of first refusal when those developments are 
sold). 
 149. See Coates, supra note 138 (“Perhaps after a serious discussion and de-
bate—the kind that HR 40 proposes—we may find that the country can never 
fully repay African Americans. But we stand to discover much about ourselves 
in such a discussion—and that is perhaps what scares us. The idea of repara-
tions is frightening not simply because we might lack the ability to pay. The 
idea of reparations threatens something much deeper—America’s heritage, his-
tory, and standing in the world.”). But cf. David Frum, The Impossibility of Rep-
arations, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2014/06/the-impossibility-of-reparations/372041/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K9MF-5HWP] (cataloging questions which a potential reparations remedy 
would face and arguing that the debate that would accompany a serious repa-
rations proposal would likely further embitter divisions between African Amer-
icans, other immigrant groups, and progressive whites, threating their already 
tenuous political coalition).  
 150. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 138 (“Charles Ogletree, the Harvard Law 
School professor, argues for something broader: a program of job training and 
public works that takes racial justice as its mission but includes the poor of all 
races.”). 
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riously. The judiciary in the United States should prepare to re-
ceive a land-based reparations bill and to evaluate a Takings 
Clause challenge fairly and effectively. 
As described in Part I, the predominant theme of Takings 
jurisprudence is that reviewing courts usually defer to the legis-
lature’s findings on the public use of a project, only invaliding 
legislation where the project bears no rational relation to any 
public interest. More rigorous standards exist, however, and a 
land-based reparations bill passed in the near future may be re-
quired to meet those standards. Section A describes the recep-
tion of a land-based reparations bill under the deferential, ra-
tional basis standard. Section B examines evidence of more 
stringent approaches to Takings, namely textualist and natural 
rights theories. Section C describes the natural rights theory of 
property in detail, using Richard Epstein’s book Takings to illus-
trate how this theory would imposes stronger limitations on the 
government’s ability to interfere with private market activity.  
A. A LAND-BASED REPARATIONS BILL WOULD LIKELY BE 
UPHELD UNDER THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD. 
Courts have deferred to the findings of the legislature in 
Takings cases largely due to reasoning that because the elected 
legislature better understands and represents the interests of 
the public than the judiciary, courts should defer to legislative 
findings and opinions on whether the measure constitutes a le-
gitimate public use.151 Public use, in this paradigm, is a dynamic, 
not static, concept: what may be an illegitimate use of govern-
ment eminent domain powers for private enrichment in one set 
of circumstances may provide public utility in another.152 Alt-
hough cases can be found where the legislature’s appropriations 
 
 151. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239, 244 (1984) (citing 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (1954) (“Con-
gress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into ac-
count a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.”). 
 152. See Jonathan Lahn, Note, The Uses of History in the Supreme Court’s 
Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2006) (quoting 
Justice Sutherland’s description of the increasing complexities of modern life 
which is used as justification for the state’s imposition of zoning restrictions in 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
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of property were not rationally related to a possible public pur-
pose,153 in most cases the legislature’s projects meet this low 
threshold.154  
In this paradigm, a land-based reparations bill would likely 
turn out similarly to the affirmation of the Hawaii Land Reform 
Act in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. The plaintiffs in a 
challenge to a land-based reparations Act would be landowners 
and would be the payers of the reparations in the sense that they 
are required to sell a parcel to a reparations beneficiary (though 
they receive just compensation). Plaintiffs would allege that the 
measure does not serve a legitimate public use, especially since 
their Taken property would end up being used purely by private 
individuals. Yet Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the unanimous 
Court in Midkiff contains ample language in support of the leg-
islature’s authority and primary role in responding to the partic-
ularities of the problems facing their constituents. Justice 
O’Connor describes the Land Reform Act as an “attempt[] [by 
the people of Hawaii], much as the settlers of the original [thir-
teen] Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and economic 
evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs,” and states 
that “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a 
classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”155  
If Congress were to pass a bill granting land-based repara-
tions for slavery, it would almost certainly contain a description 
of slavery’s legacy as a land oligopoly traceable to “monarchs” of 
a kind: the plantation owners and the auctioneers, the state leg-
islatures that kept slavery legal, and the federal policies which 
foreclosed the one real attempt at allocating freed African Amer-
icans a productive measure of property and means.156 The vac-
uum of wealth and land for freed African Americans would play 
 
 153. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (finding that the government could not 
compel a private railroad company to construct a grain elevator purely and ex-
plicitly for use by a private party (citing Mo. Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 
403, 416 (1896))). 
 154. Id. (“[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated 
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”). 
 155. Id. at 241–42. 
 156. See, e.g., Commission To Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for 
African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017) (“following the aboli-
tion of slavery the United States Government, at the Federal, State, and local 
level, continued to perpetuate, condone and often profit from practices that con-
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a similar role in the public use Takings analysis as the feudal 
practices of the Polynesian people in Hawaii played in explaining 
the land oligopoly in Midkiff. Provided that Congress did an ad-
equate job articulating and explaining reparations in terms of 
public benefit, a reviewing court would likely hold that Con-
gress’s aims are within the scope of its powers157 and that the 
reparations scheme is reasonably related to those aims, and the 
court would hold that the reparations are for public use, citing 
Midkiff and the principle of deference to the legislature’s find-
ings on what constitute the evils of our time. 
B. A STRICTER TEXTUALIST AND/OR NATURAL RIGHTS 
STANDARD MAY BE APPLIED. 
The deferential approach is not without critics on the Su-
preme Court. Kelo v. City of New London was a 5–4 decision and 
the dissents contain several lines of reasoning opposing the def-
erential approach.158 In Kelo, the City of New London approved 
a development plan which entailed using the city’s eminent do-
main power to condemn residential properties and give much of 
the property to Pfizer Inc.159 Susette Kelo, one of the local home-
owners to be ousted by the plan, argued that the city’s plan did 
not satisfy the public use requirement of the Takings Clause.160 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, applying the deferential, ra-
tional basis standard, held that “economic development” is a 
valid public use, notwithstanding that the development would 
occur at the hands of a private party.161 The narrow Supreme 
Court majority, citing Midkiff, upheld the decision, rejecting pe-
 
tinued to brutalize and disadvantage African-Americans, including share crop-
ping, convict leasing, Jim Crow, redlining, unequal education, and dispropor-
tionate treatment at the hands of the criminal justice system . . . .”). 
 157. This Note focuses on reparations and the Takings Clause, which is a 
limitation on government power, and does not endeavor to catalog the affirma-
tive powers of Congress which could underpin potential reparations bills. As a 
perfunctory matter, reparations bills could likely be justified under the Spend-
ing Clause, the Commerce Clause, and potentially the Thirteenth Amendment 
itself. As mentioned above, cash-based reparations schemes have already sur-
vived strict scrutiny constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 
313 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 158. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 159. Id. at 472–73. 
 160. Id. at 475. 
 161. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 528 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 545 
U.S. 469. 
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titioner’s request to adopt a bright-line rule that economic devel-
opment does not constitute a public use and noting that “the gov-
ernment’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individ-
ual private parties.”162 Justice Kennedy wrote separately, 
joining the majority but cautioning that “[a] court confronted 
with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to pri-
vate parties should treat the objection as a serious one” and sug-
gested that a presumption of invalidity under the public use 
clause be applied when the risk of impermissible favoritism is 
“acute.”163 Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas 
joined in the dissent, and Thomas also wrote separately.  
A slippery slope theme pervades the dissents and the peti-
tioner’s briefs.164 Two strains of thought underly the slippery 
slope theme: a narrow textualist reading of the Fifth Amend-
ment itself165 and an appeal to American first principles of indi-
vidual property rights.166 The first view is reminiscent of the 
“public use means use by the public” argument: though this ar-
gument has been rejected by the Supreme Court,167 versions of 
it have survived in state courts. In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 
for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a county’s 
economic development plan under the Michigan state constitu-
tion’s “Takings Clause,” stating that the transfer of property to 
private entities is limited to situations where the private recipi-
ent bears some special relationship or duty to the public.168 
 
 162. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484–85. 
 163. Id. at 491–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 164. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 
2811059 (stating in a section heading that “a ruling affirming the Connecticut 
Supreme Court will open the floodgates”). 
 165. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)). 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 501 (“[I]f predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side 
effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another consti-
tutional, then the words ‘for public use’ do not realistically exclude any takings, 
and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.”). 
 167. See supra Part I.D. 
 168. Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781–83 (Mich. 2004) (de-
scribing three situations where transfer of condemned property to private enti-
ties would be permissible: (1) “public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise 
impracticable,” such as the construction of highways; (2) the private entity re-
mains accountable to the public; and (3) the selection of land to be condemned 
is itself based on public concern). 
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On the second argument, Jonathan Lahn observed that 
Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Lucas, along with the dis-
sents of Justices O’Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Roberts in Kelo, 
appeal to static, transcendent “first principles” of American con-
stitutional law.169 In Lucas, Justice Scalia describes the South 
Carolina Coastal Council’s argument as “inconsistent with the 
historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has be-
come part of our constitutional culture.”170 In Kelo, the dissent-
ing Justices begin by quoting a 1798 opinion stating that “[a] law 
that takes property from A and gives it to B . . . is against all 
reason and justice.”171 Justice Thomas goes further and cites 
“[e]arly American eminent domain practice” as a source of un-
derstanding what content the public use requirement should 
carry today.172 He cites “the overriding respect for the sanctity of 
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the or-
igins of the Republic” to illustrate the need for more stringent 
limitations on governmental use of eminent domain.173 He also 
posits that “it is most implausible that the Framers intended to 
defer to legislatures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause, 
uniquely among all the express provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.”174  
With Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh confirmed, the def-
erential majority coalition in Kelo has likely waned into a minor-
ity position. Justice Kennedy, the Court’s swing vote on many  
5–4 decisions including Kelo, was replaced by Justice Ka-
vanaugh. The Court’s attitude towards the legislature and the 
relationship between government and private property will 
likely resemble Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo. Because of this, 
the Court will require a strong showing from Congress as to why 
 
 169. Lahn, supra note 152, at 1235 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992)). 
 170. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 (referring to common law principles of nuisance 
and property). 
 171. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (2005) (O’Connor, Thomas, Scalia, & Rehnquist, 
JJ., dissenting) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1789)). 
 172. Id. at 511 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 518. 
 174. Id. at 517–18 (describing the public use question as a “quintessentially 
legal question” inappropriate for the legislature); see also Raphael Janove, 
Yielding to the Confiscation of Public and Private Property: Judicial Deference 
Under the Copyright and Takings Clauses, 39 VT. L. REV. 89, 102–04 (2014) 
(describing four levels of deference between the Justices in Kelo, labelling Jus-
tice Thomas’s position as: “[n]o deference or at the very least . . . [only] if the 
public ‘actually uses’ the land”). 
  
2020] PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS 2137 
 
the land-based reparations constitute a valid public use. The 
Court may shift towards a more textualist reading of the public 
use requirement and it may shift towards a view couched in 
American first principles. The following Section articulates the 
content of the American first principles line of argument: a nat-
ural rights theory of property. 
C. A NATURAL RIGHTS THEORY OF PROPERTY AND THE MARKET 
FAILURE TEST. 
Property-based reparations are more complicated than cash 
reparations because somebody must give up their land. Although 
many think of property chiefly as policy, as a social arrangement 
or institution,175 deep currents of American thought resist the 
notion that property fundamentally depends on the state.176 In 
his book Takings, Richard Epstein articulates a classical liberal 
framework for Takings Clause analysis, which he introduces by 
examining a Lockean natural rights theory of property.177 Ep-
stein’s work is widely cited, including in the main text of Su-
preme Court opinions in Takings cases, including Lucas,178 and 
this Note uses Epstein as a voice for the Lockean classical liberal 
theory of property which may motivate a Court less inclined to 
defer to the legislature’s notions of public use.179 The political 
philosophy of John Locke has been described as “the weapon of 
choice for contemporary opponents of social welfare rights,”180 
the idea being that a welfare state exceeds the bounds of what 
the state was authorized to do under Locke’s framework. Regard-
less of whether one views Locke as friend or foe, the degree of his 
 
 175. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY 
LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 1 (2012). 
 176. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10; cf. 2018 Platform, LIBERTARIAN 
PARTY, https://www.lp.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc/K83M-4H9Z] (“[W]e op-
pose all government interference with private property, such as confiscation, 
nationalization, and eminent domain.”). 
 177. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10–12. 
 178. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 179. Classical liberalism is “conservative” in contemporary terms. See NA-
THAN SCHLUETER & NIKOLAI WENZEL, SELFISH LIBERTARIANS AND SOCIALIST 
CONSERVATIVES?: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE LIBERTARIAN-CONSERVATIVE DE-
BATE 14 (2017) (arguing that “conservatism rests on recognition of the mutual 
interdependence of liberty, tradition, and reason,” then describing the American 
founding, which uniquely achieved the “equilibrium” of these elements, as mo-
tivated by principles of classical liberalism or “natural law liberalism”). 
 180. Peter P. Cvek, John Locke, Social Welfare and the U.S. Constitution, 27 
ZBORNIK RADOVA 99, 101 (1990). 
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influence on the structure and purpose of the Constitution is be-
yond doubt.181 
Epstein begins Takings with a description, taken from the 
natural rights tradition, of inequality of individual property 
rights as a “natural” state of affairs.182 Some have always had 
more and some have always had less.183 However, in the absence 
of a functioning state authority, everyone must waste a lot of re-
sources defending against usurpations. Both rich and poor agree, 
the reasoning goes, that they would be absolutely better off if 
they surrendered some of their natural rights to a state. In a 
well-functioning state, each citizen-beneficiary is given a share 
of the surplus utility from the state proportional to the resources 
they contributed.184 Due to this proportionality of returns prin-
ciple, the state undertakes only to increase absolute wealth, not 
the relative wealth of some citizens.185 
Under the Lockean natural rights view, meaningful prop-
erty rights exist prior to the formation of the state.186 These “nat-
ural” property rights are based on the common law principle of 
first possession.187  Contrary to the Hobbesian view that the in-
dividual surrenders all of their prior rights to the state as a req-
uisite for state formation, the Lockean view holds that the indi-
vidual only surrenders the rights necessary for the state to 
guarantee basic peace and predictability in private affairs.188 
The state must rigorously justify intrusions into one individual’s 
 
 181. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 162 (“I believe the public use limitation 
is an integral part of the eminent domain clause. The best way to approach the 
problem is as a matter of political theory, to show how the public use language 
fits in with the Lockean conception of the state.”). 
 182. Id. at 3–4. 
 183. However, the euphemistic character of the term “natural rights” comes 
into view here: inequality is deemed “natural” without mention of the specific 
acts which resulted in that inequality, however inhumane or unnatural they 
may have been, such as American slavery. 
 184. Id. at 5.  
 185. See id. at 163 (“This pro rata distribution had, it must be stressed, an 
important allocative function because it does not skew the incentives of private 
parties in the choice between public and private control over human affairs. For 
example, if each person received an equal portion of the general gain, there 
would be an incentive for persons with smaller shares to force matters into the 
public area, where they would be relative gainers.”). 
 186. Id. at 10. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 4 (describing the role of the state not to equalize the relative dis-
tributions of wealth and natural rights, but merely to increase each party’s 
gross prosperity). 
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private sphere in terms of the individual rights of another person 
being protected.189  
On this view, the state does not have inherent authority to 
solve social problems, such as inequality, absent a showing that 
another individual’s rights have been violated—the mere exist-
ence of inequality, accompanied by a resolution from the legisla-
ture declaring that inequality is bad, is not enough to justify gov-
ernment intrusion on the current, “natural” holding of property. 
Some ills are left to the free market to solve. For Epstein, this 
limitation is expressed in the Constitution as the Takings 
Clause, specifically the public use requirement.190  
What is capable of satisfying the public use requirement in 
a natural rights paradigm? To answer that question, it is helpful 
to return to the benefits sought by state formation in the first 
place. The state was granted some measure of police power to 
protect individuals from incursions by others. Because the state 
must possess and manage property itself in order to bring about 
its benefits, some property must be transferred from private 
hands to public.191 If this transfer is left entirely to voluntary 
exchanges in the free market, the state would never achieve its 
ends because it would never acquire the necessary property and 
resources. The solution is to grant the state the power to compel 
transactions when necessary. According to Epstein, “[t]here are 
transaction costs, holdout, and free-rider problems that are al-
most insuperable when the conduct of a large number of individ-
uals must be organized.” To this problem, the proper response is 
to force exchanges upon payment for public use.192 
In other words, Takings are justified as a valid public use if 
they are necessary to solve a problem that voluntary free associ-
ations are demonstrably incapable of solving. A classically lib-
eral “Epsteinian” take on the public use question can be articu-
lated as the following test: the state, specifically the legislature, 
must demonstrate why the free market is incapable of effectively 
 
 189. Id. at 181 (expressing dissatisfaction at the legislature’s findings in Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) because they did not 
demonstrate the existence of a market-obstructing “oligopoly” as the standard 
an antitrust expert would accept). 
 190. Id. at 12. 
 191. Id. at 4.  
 192. Id. at 5. 
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achieving the ends sought by the appropriation.193 This Note re-
fers to this test as the “market failure test.” This failure can be 
articulated in terms of transaction costs, monopolies, holdouts, 
and the like. Whatever the logic behind the particular failure, 
for Epstein the demand remains rigorous.194 
In more practical terms, a reparations bill would be required 
to present findings not only about why reparations would benefit 
the public, but would also be required to articulate why author-
ization of the eminent domain power is necessary.195 Repara-
tions proponents would be required to show why the govern-
ment’s typical practice of simply purchasing land would not 
suffice for this project.  
Part II has described the deferential approach to Takings, 
under which a property-based reparations bill would meet with 
little challenge. Part II also looked to natural rights philosophy 
to explain the more stringent market failure test, and Part II 
examined evidence of the possibility that Takings jurisprudence 
might move towards such a test.  
III.  EVALUATING THE PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS   
Protests about race relations196 and about the state’s role in 
governing property197 continue to fill our streets, more than a 
 
 193. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 61, 82 (1986) (“The basic model posits that eminent domain is designed 
to increase social wealth by facilitating certain transactions that otherwise 
would not take place, or that would take place only at an inefficiently high 
cost.”). 
 194. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 124–25 (arguing for the striking of a stat-
ute regulating strip-mining because it deprives landowners of one of the natural 
rights of using their property and that “simple alteration of privately owned 
lands does not come within a light year of invasion on another’s property”).  
 195. See Merrill, supra note 193, at 81 (“If private developers and the like 
can get by without eminent domain, the critics ask, then why cannot the gov-
ernment?”). 
 196. BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory/ 
[https://perma.cc/M6G2-JSQ8] (protesting, inter alia, the killing of African 
Americans by police officers). 
 197. E.g., OCCUPY WALL ST., http://occupywallst.org/about/ [https://perma 
.cc/E2W2-8T9A] (highlighting wealth inequality broadly); STAND WITH STAND-
ING ROCK, https://standwithstandingrock.net/history/ [https://perma.cc/KS7P 
-RZH3] (resisting the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline through Native 
American sacred grounds without their consent—a project which used the emi-
nent domain power in Iowa); The Wall, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday 
.com/border-wall/ [https://perma.cc/56WG-EXPV] (describing the debates 
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century and a half after Emancipation. Reparations could serve 
as a turning point in race relations which would provide public 
benefits to everyone. The utility for the beneficiaries is clear, as 
African Americans would enjoy greater wealth and homeowner-
ship, which would increase their access to capital, allowing the 
development of richer social institutions to serve their needs.198 
White people would benefit by being able to let some of their guilt 
go.199 Everyone would benefit from the increased social stability 
that would come with greater racial integration. In a future that 
may hold increased social unrest and public calls for land reform, 
a well-executed reparations bill could diffuse tensions and pre-
vent more drastic actions, such as amending the Takings Clause 
to eliminate the just compensation requirement, a measure be-
ing debated in South Africa now.200 
Reparations will not solve all social problems. Indeed, there 
are some compelling reasons to refrain from implementing rep-
arations, both social and technical. It might be socially difficult 
to pay reparations to one minority group without addressing 
similar grievances from other minority groups, and differential 
treatment might exacerbate social discord to the detriment of 
their intended aims.201 The familiar technical problems of deter-
mining claimants and providing a claims mechanism remain.202 
It is Congress’s job to parse these problems and prioritize them 
against the social ills of post-slavery America.  
If a reparations bill does become law, it will undoubtedly be 
a result of intense national soul-searching and complex value 
judgments that attempt to resolve disparate narratives in our 
history. Section A argues that courts, including the Supreme 
Court, should give deference to Congress on the public use issue 
when faced with a property-based reparations bill. Section B ar-
gues that even under a more stringent natural rights conception 
of the Takings Clause, a reparations bill could satisfy the market 
 
around the wall on the Mexican border proposed by President Donald Trump; a 
project which would require use of the eminent domain power). 
 198. See Miller, supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.  
 200. See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Frum, supra note 149 (replying to Ta-Nehisi Coates’s, The Case for 
Reparations, arguing that were reparations to be pursued, the project would 
almost certainly be faced with claims for expansion to other historically op-
pressed groups, as well as greater calls for distinctions of deserving recipients 
within groups, which would create a near-insurmountable bureaucratic burden 
and would demoralize a generation of civil rights workers and activists). 
 202. See Note, supra note 26, at 1697–700. 
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failure test and be upheld as a valid public use. Drawing once 
more upon South Africa’s example, Section C explains why au-
thorization for the eminent domain power in a reparations bill 
would offer benefits beyond a purely grant-based model, even if 
voluntary transactions are prioritized as they likely would be. 
Section D addresses slippery slope and tyranny of the majority 
objections to the recognition of reparations as a public use. 
A. COURTS SHOULD RETAIN THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD 
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE IS ESPECIALLY WELL-SUITED TO 
EVALUATE THE PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS. 
In the face of increasing references to first principles of the 
American Constitution and natural rights theories of property, 
the normative reasons for deference to the legislature on the 
public use issue must be reasserted and reevaluated. Two core 
notions justify judicial deference to the legislature: first, an “in-
stitutional competence” argument which holds that the legisla-
ture is a better fact-finder and appraiser of values than the judi-
ciary;203 second, a “democratic” or separation of powers 
argument which holds that the legislature is more accountable 
to the public for its actions than the unelected judiciary.204 Both 
arguments support continued deferential review for evaluation 
of an act of reparations. Whether or not judicial deference should 
be given in all Takings Cases, it should be given in evaluating a 
reparations scheme because the legislature is especially well-
suited to ascertain and weigh the noneconomic, sociopolitical ills 
of its constituents.  
In the Takings jurisprudence on deference to the legislature, 
the Supreme Court usually undertakes to give a short normative 
justification for its deference.205 When making an institutional 
competence argument, the Court posits that the legislature is 
more aware of something than the judiciary is capable of being, 
the content of the thing varying based on the facts of the case. 
For example, in Kelo the Court defers to the economic judgment 
 
 203. Dru Stevenson, Judicial Deference to Legislatures in Constitutional 
Analysis, 90 N.C. L. REV. 2083, 2122 (2012). 
 204. Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use 
Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 274 (2012). 
 205. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (giv-
ing deference because of the “thorough deliberation” that the city of New London 
undertook in crafting their economic plan). 
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of the lawmakers in the city of New London.206 In other cases, 
that deference is cast less in economic terms and more in terms 
of sociopolitical, even aesthetic values. In Berman v. Parker, the 
Court memorably described the concept of public welfare as 
“spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”207 
The urban renewal plan upheld in that case was based not only 
upon economic development, but because “[m]iserable and dis-
reputable housing conditions . . . suffocate the spirit by reducing 
the people who live there to the status of cattle.”208 The Court, 
rather than undertake an independent assessment of the truth 
of this claim, deferred to the judgment of those who govern the 
District of Columbia.209 
The lawmakers in New London, who presumably walked 
and drove through the town with regularity and perhaps experi-
enced economic distress firsthand, relied on their familiarity 
with local nuance when deciding that the town would be served 
by allowing Pfizer to build a campus where Mrs. Kelo’s house 
stood.210 These lawmakers would be subject to political conse-
quences if the project failed or the constituents were displeased 
with the use of the eminent domain power.211 A judicial nullifi-
cation of this legislative act based on its own opinions about the 
propriety of the project would be improper, the reasoning goes, 
because the judiciary is a much worse fact-finder and does not 
understand the “long established methods and habits of the peo-
ple” as well as the legislature, nor are judges subject to the same 
political accountability.212  
 
 206. See id. at 483 (“Those who govern the City were not confronted with the 
need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that 
the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvena-
tion is entitled to our deference.”). 
 207. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 208. Id. at 32. 
 209. Id. at 33. 
 210. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473, 483. 
 211. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102–03 (2009) (cataloging political responses 
to the Kelo decision, including state legislation forbidding economic develop-
ment takings, and quoting Judge Richard Posner stating that this political re-
sponse is evidence of the soundness of the Kelo decision (quoting Richard A. 
Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Forward—A Political Court, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 31, 98 (2005))). 
 212. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83 (quoting Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 
208 U.S. 598, 606–07 (1908)). 
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In Midkiff, the case that most closely resembles a potential 
land-based reparations act, the problem of land oligopoly and the 
findings made by the Hawaii state legislature were described 
primarily in the economic terms of the fee simple market, but 
the Court also described the legislature as a decisionmaker 
which takes into account the competing interests of citizens with 
vastly different standings in the social landscape: landlords and 
tenants, lessors and lessees.213 The Court acknowledged how the 
legislature’s solution took into account both the undeniable need 
for land redistribution and the legitimate worries of the land-
owners, such as their federal tax burden.214  
Outside the Takings context, there are ample cases where 
courts have deferred to entities based on institutional compe-
tence. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court deferred to the man-
agement decisions of federal prison administrators regarding 
punishments, sleeping arrangements, and restrictions on in-
mate access to published materials.215 In Chevron, the Supreme 
Court deferred to the decision of the Environmental Protection 
Agency regarding how to implement a “technical and complex” 
environmental regulatory scheme.216 The theme here is that en-
tities which are in close contact with their subject matter217 and 
engage in judgments weighing values against one another218 are 
entitled to judicial deference. 
It is the legislature’s unique ability to serve as the arbiter of 
these complex moral tradeoffs that would justify judicial defer-
ence in a reparations case on institutional competence grounds. 
If legislatures are better than courts at making economic judg-
ments about public use because of their unique closeness to the 
people, legislatures are even more in-tune with the social, ethnic, 
 
 213. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984). 
 214. Id. at 233. 
 215. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (stating that prison adminis-
trators “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execu-
tion of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve in-
ternal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security” (citations 
omitted)). 
 216. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984). 
 217. See Oren Eisner, Note, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential In-
terpretations of Ambiguities in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes 
Delegating Lawmaking Power to the President, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 434 
(2001). 
 218. Stevenson, supra note 203. 
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and spiritual issues important to their constituents.219 A repara-
tions bill passed into law would represent a complex, highly de-
liberated judgment that Congress undertook in dialogue with 
the nation. The judiciary has not undertaken to put its finger on 
the pulse of race relations in America, and that is not its institu-
tional charge.220 In evaluating a reparations act and deciding 
whether to defer to the judgment of the legislature or undertake 
a more rigorous review of the merits of the act, courts should 
pause and remember the weight of our country’s history, the 
moral trials that every American has faced in navigating the 
deep division between black and white, and the fact that the leg-
islature, not the judiciary, has participated in that conversation. 
B. EVEN IF COURTS DO NOT RETAIN THE DEFERENTIAL 
STANDARD, THE SLOW PACE OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WEALTH 
GROWTH CAN CONSTITUTE A MARKET FAILURE, SATISFYING THE 
NATURAL RIGHTS STANDARD 
As the Takings jurisprudence makes more frequent refer-
ences to the first principles taken from substantive property the-
ories, courts may ask more questions about why a particular em-
inent domain measure should be the province of government 
intervention and not of private voluntary transactions in the free 
market.221 This market failure requirement can be met in situa-
tions where structural factors make those transactions impossi-
ble or especially unlikely to occur voluntarily, such as when mo-
nopolies and holdouts are involved. 
The intergenerational effects of slavery can satisfy the mar-
ket failure test. In the first instance, being enslaved meant being 
artificially severed from all market activity due to the tortious 
actions of the master.222 Slavery can be described as one of our 
nation’s biggest structural barriers to free market participation: 
black people could not trade their labor for any meaningful gains 
while enslaved.223 After Emancipation, one of our nation’s most 
 
 219. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 220. Cf. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Ap-
proaches to Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 
2145–46 (2003) (discussing whether the judiciary or legislature is the institu-
tion best suited to address sex discrimination). 
 221. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 222. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 11 (describing foundational principles of 
labor, including that “each individual owns his own labor”). 
 223. Cf. CHARLES BALL, LIFE OF A NEGRO SLAVE (ABR.) 8 (1923 ed.), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=WrNcAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA8#v=onepage& 
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enduring property problems came into being: the monopoly of 
landownership by whites and the absolute vacuum of African 
American wealth.224 Despite being finally able to trade labor for 
money and property, it was difficult for freed African Americans 
to obtain land, especially after the plantation owners had all 
their holdings fully restored by President Johnson.225 Genera-
tions later, African Americans own homes at a rate far below 
whites, and social stability is tenuous.226  
Independent from all concerns about private discrimination 
in free market transactions, it is clear that the sudden emanci-
pation of an entire demographic of people without any personal 
property, coupled with a scarcity of land, poses a serious struc-
tural problem for the free and natural distribution of property in 
the marketplace.227 This situation can be described as a monop-
oly problem (e.g., one group has a monopoly on the fee simple 
market), which can be described more fundamentally as a type 
of holdout problem because the monopolizing party has little in-
centive to further divide market shares by allowing another 
group to participate in the market.228 However Congress may de-
scribe the precise contours of these problems, it is clear that they 
are the same type of structural problems that someone applying 
a market failure analysis would deem a permissible use of the 
eminent domain power.229 
The structural barriers to market participation facing freed 
African Americans could constitute a market failure by them-
selves, but those problems alone are not the whole story. Add in 
widespread private discrimination and violence against black 
people, along with state and local laws aimed at preventing black 
homeownership,230 and the failure of free, voluntary transac-
tions to provide for African Americans after Emancipation is ap-
parent beyond doubt. The structural problems were most appar-
ent in the very beginning of Emancipation, as such federal 
 
q&f=false (noting that slaves were permitted to work for wages at other planta-
tions only on Sundays). 
 224. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See O’Connell, supra note 121. 
 227. See Alan W. Evans, On Monopoly Rent, 67 LAND ECON. 1, 2–4 (1991). 
 228. See Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dom-
inance in Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 520 (2002). 
 229. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 230. See generally MAPPING PREJUDICE, supra note 139 (cataloging discrim-
inatory housing practices geographically). 
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efforts as the Freedmen’s Bureau recognized, but private dis-
crimination has fueled those problems throughout the genera-
tions. Entrenched private discrimination should be recognized  
as a structural problem worthy of government intervention 
through eminent domain power under a market failure analy-
sis.231 
The land oligopoly in Midkiff formally resembles the dearth 
of African American wealth: one population (in Midkiff, the Pol-
ynesian people, and white Europeans in mainland America) pop-
ulates and covers the land, improving the soil and claiming it for 
themselves, then a minority group arrives (the American colo-
nists in Midkiff and the slaves, involuntarily, in the mainland) 
and is forced to bargain against the monopoly that has taken 
hold. The Court said that “[t]he land oligopoly has, according to 
the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the nor-
mal functioning of the State’s residential land market” and even 
used the words “market failure” when describing the Land Re-
form Act as a rational response to the problem.232 Although there 
is a superficial irony to citing Midkiff to support reparations (Ha-
waii was a truly rare American historical oddity where indige-
nous people of color actually held an important market monop-
oly), courts should recognize the formal similarity between 
Midkiff and reparations for slavery and be prepared to hold, 
upon a proper showing from Congress, that the failure of the free 
market to provide for adequate African American intergenera-
tional wealth is a failure worthy of government intervention for 
Takings Clause purposes. 
Richard Epstein, this Note’s voice for use of the market fail-
ure test, critiqued Midkiff in his book Takings. If a reparations 
proponent cites Midkiff, it would be worthwhile to evaluate his 
critique. The basis of Epstein’s critique was that a market failure 
had not been demonstrated. He wrote, “No antitrust expert 
thinks ‘oligopoly’ because there are ‘only’ seventy or twenty-two 
or eighteen landowners in a given market. Why then allow the 
legislature to so find?”233 This is facially unconvincing without 
 
 231. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (holding that 
Congress could regulate racial discrimination in the private sector under the 
Commerce Clause where that discrimination impeded interstate commerce). 
 232. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984). 
 233. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 181. 
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reference to the size of the theoretical markets being evalu-
ated.234 Nor does Epstein explain why the notion of oligopoly as 
it is used in the antitrust field, which concerns the legality of 
private action, should be the standard for the public use question 
under the Takings Clause, which concerns the legality of legis-
lative action. He goes on to invoke other vague premises, stating, 
for example, that the problem of land inequality here “does [not] 
depend upon the overall structure of the market.”235 Finally, he 
blames “the extensive network of state land use regulations” for 
the problem of land shortages and high prices.236 
In the sense that discriminatory housing codes can be 
blamed for the shortage of land available to African Americans, 
Epstein may be right about state land use regulations. In gen-
eral, however, courts evaluating a reparations act should take 
care to avoid reasoning in an overly general way about market 
failures, as Epstein does. In considering “the overall structure of 
the market,” courts should remember the monumental imbal-
ance of property that faced African Americans as they entered 
the market for the first time.237 Courts should remember that 
our nation recognized this problem once, in the creation of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau and the promise of forty acres and a mule, 
yet resources were eliminated for this project before it could bear 
fruit.238  
Courts should also make their evaluations with an eye to-
wards South Africa, where the demand for land reform has got-
ten so great that it is quite possible, if not likely, that their Prop-
erty Clause will be amended to eliminate the just compensation 
requirement. The next section examines how the balance be-
tween voluntary transactions and eminent domain was struck in 
South Africa and offers insights for reparations proponents in 
 
 234. For example, envision a situation where one individual lives on each 
parcel and each parcel is equivalent. Each individual can be an owner or a 
renter of their parcel. If there are twenty-two parcels and twenty-two owners, 
then there is certainly no land oligopoly. But, if there are ten million parcels 
and only twenty-two owners, there may well be a land oligopoly. The Hawaii 
legislature made findings on the number of parcels and owners in Hawaii and 
in its various islands and subdivisions. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232 (“[T]he Hawaii 
Legislature discovered that, while the State and Federal Governments owned 
almost 49% of the State’s land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private 
landowners.”). 
 235. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 181.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id.  
 238. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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legislatures to consider in striking that balance more produc-
tively, which reviewing courts should also note when evaluating 
the public use question. 
C. LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA: MARKET FAILURE IS A REAL 
CONCERN AND AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THE EMINENT 
DOMAIN POWER COULD MAKE REPARATIONS WORK BETTER 
South Africa’s land reform efforts have stagnated through a 
generation, leaving many South Africans unsatisfied and feeling 
like Mandela’s party failed to deliver on fundamentals of its post-
apartheid vision.239 There are many reasons for this, but amidst 
it all, there is consensus in government that the willing buyer, 
willing seller policy has not worked.240 The free market has 
failed to incentivize land transfers and failed to provide the in-
frastructure necessary for beneficiaries to make productive use 
of their claimed land. This situation is a paradigmatic market 
failure worthy of government intervention. 
In South Africa, the constitutional basis for government in-
tervention using the eminent domain power is undisputed in this 
arena.241 Yet, the government pursued the willing buyer, willing 
seller policy.242 The willing buyer, willing seller policy is symp-
tomatic of a deep hesitance from the government about use of 
the eminent domain power for land reform. On the individual 
level, motivations for this hesitance likely diverge greatly and 
may range from legitimate concern for the rights and well-being 
of white landowners to outright self-interest, fraud, and obstruc-
tionism.243 Whatever the reason, the result has been disappoint-
ing at best: land ownership inequality remains stark, claimants 
are frustrated with the administration’s hesitance and slow 
pace, and those who have received land have not been supported 
in utilizing it.244 To the extent that the willing buyer, willing 
 
 239. See Lannegren & Ito, supra note 85, at 57. 
 240. REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THE ASSESSMENT OF KEY LEG-
ISLATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 203 (2017), 
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 243. See, e.g., Milton Nkosi, Is South Africa’s Land Reform an Election Gim-
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seller policy was motivated by a desire to protect private prop-
erty rights in the abstract, it backfired completely: there is real 
work being done to amend the Property Clause of the South Af-
rica Constitution to eliminate the compensation requirement.245 
According to some, even talk of this amendment has destabilized 
investments in the South African economy.246 
Should Congress undertake land-based reparations in the 
United States, both Congress and the judiciary should avoid re-
peating the mistakes inherent in South Africa’s willing buyer, 
willing seller policy. Of course, Congress would likely elect to 
pursue voluntary sales of land before resorting to eminent do-
main, as is typically practiced in government land use pro-
jects.247 This would be conceptually consistent with reparations 
and desirable since it avoids the resentment generated by emi-
nent domain.248 Acknowledging this, there are nevertheless im-
portant reasons why Congress may elect to authorize use of the 
eminent domain power for reparations, even if eminent domain 
proceedings would rarely be initiated.   
The authorization for use of eminent domain may bring 
some landowners to the negotiating table who would not be oth-
erwise interested in selling.249 This would save government re-
sources and expedite the timetable, allowing the program to be 
implemented more fully. Some decisive use of the eminent do-
main power early on in South Africa would have likely been a 
more effective way to transfer land and focus government re-
sources on actually helping benefits claimants set up productive 
lives there.  
Furthermore, eminent domain would allow a reparations 
program to penetrate markets which would be difficult to pene-
trate if the government simply engaged in voluntary purchas-
ing.250 A land-based reparations bill should be designed to meet 
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the contemporary needs of beneficiaries, meaning that the sub-
ject of the bill could be, for example, urban rental apartments 
which the bill would allow claimants to purchase as condomini-
ums. These units are generally not posted for sale on the market, 
so a declaration of the government’s authority to use eminent 
domain could bring these landowners to the table.251 Insofar as 
modern urban landscapes still bear the effects of expressly dis-
criminatory government policy, authorization for use of the em-
inent domain power to disrupt these patterns would be even 
more appropriate.252 Forcing the United States back into an en-
tirely willing buyer, willing seller approach by curtailing the gov-
ernment’s use of the eminent domain power could turn well 
thought out reparations into an administratively arduous and 
socially unfulfilling project like South Africa’s. A court reviewing 
a Takings Clause challenge to land-based reparations legislation 
should pay special attention to Congress’s findings on the fail-
ures of the free market to accomplish its ends.253  
Beyond the use of the eminent domain power itself, there 
are several other lessons to be gleaned from South Africa when 
considering land-based reparations in the United States. Posner 
and Vermeule describe reparations as fundamentally back-
wards-looking,254 but the example of South Africa highlights the 
importance of forward thinking for reparations to be meaningful. 
Of course, there cannot be reparations without an original in-
jury, so there must be some amount of backwards-looking in rep-
arations.255 But forward thinking, e.g. consideration of the prop-
erty needs of African Americans in their present economic and 
geographic orientations, should not damage the conceptual in-
tegrity of reparations.256 Indeed, the original injury would be 
better healed when more thought is put into effects.  
More concretely, reparations should not focus too much on a 
strict identity relationship between past and present vic-
tims/beneficiaries and wrongdoers/payers and should instead fo-
cus on beneficiaries’ real needs in the present.257 South Africa 
chose to focus on redistributing rural farmland because that was 
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the land that was taken from them or their recent ancestors.258 
This identity relationship (i.e. the fact that the land they are get-
ting is the same land that was taken from them) is superficially 
satisfying, but seems to result in beneficiaries receiving some-
thing that is not useful or meaningful to them.259 In terms of 
Posner and Vermeule’s taxonomy of reparations relationships,260 
it could be said that South Africa’s government described the re-
lationship between the original victim and the possible benefi-
ciaries too literally: the goal was to put beneficiaries back in the 
position that the original victims were in before the injury.  
There are better ways to conceive of this relationship. Rep-
arations beneficiaries will always carry their past with them, but 
they look toward the future. Reparations work better when they 
consider what would help beneficiaries flourish in the present. 
Should Congress undertake land-based reparations, Congress 
should avoid basing its remedies on the past and should consider 
the contemporary forces of urbanization, urban segregation, and 
differential job availability that shape the lives of descendants 
of slaves. Productive land transfers to reparations recipients 
would, at least for the coming decade, more likely involve trans-
fer of urban residential property on an individual claimant or 
group claim basis than land to be worked itself.  
The legislation in Midkiff was well-designed because it en-
sured that claimants would receive land that was immediately 
useful: they were already living there.261 Land-based reparations 
could employ that same mechanism. It could even go farther and 
grant beneficiaries the right to purchase land that would make 
them even more productive than their current situation allows. 
Beneficiaries could, for example, be granted a right to purchase 
housing in competitive markets where there are broader job op-
tions and higher income potentials.262 This immediate grant of 
capital in the form of homeownership is both backward-looking 
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because it is designed to remedy the initial vacuum of African 
American wealth that existed after slavery ended and forward-
looking because it promotes participation in economic activities 
that the beneficiary actually desires to and is qualified to partic-
ipate in. 
Use of the eminent domain power in land-based reparations 
would promote ends such as these better than a grant program 
reflecting a willing buyer, willing seller approach would. The free 
market has failed to naturally rectify the inequalities facing Af-
rican Americans.263 Discrimination in housing still exists, and 
even if it is not present, unequal access to capital stemming gen-
erations prevents African Americans from entering competitive 
markets through voluntary private transactions.264 A land-based 
reparations scheme that employed strategic use of the eminent 
domain power would have greater social impact and avoid the 
bureaucratic nightmare that a protracted willing buyer, willing 
seller grant program could very plausibly entail in light of South 
Africa’s recent history. 
D. A HOLDING AFFIRMING A LAND-BASED REPARATIONS BILL 
COULD BE NARROW AND AVOID SLIPPERY SLOPE OR TYRANNY OF 
THE MAJORITY CONCERNS 
When Kelo was argued, petitioners and their amici por-
trayed economic development Takings as a “floodgate” leading to 
municipalities condemning any property they desired if it would 
be used more productively, i.e. generate more tax revenue.265 
Were economic development ratified as a valid public use, there 
would be little to stop “10,000 pound gorilla[s]”266 like Pfizer from 
courting governments into using their eminent domain power. 
Yet, the Court upheld it. In the reparations context, critics may 
argue that were reparations-style backwards-looking corrective 
justice recognized as a valid public use, that there would be little 
to stop a majority coalition from continuing to distribute prop-
erty to demographics they have taken under their wing.267 They 
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may point to South Africa’s ousting of white farmers from agri-
cultural land and the potential for violent backlash as the inevi-
table result of recognizing the public use of reparations.268  
There are two related concerns here: slippery slope and tyr-
anny of the majority. Slippery slope arguments take one valid 
thing and extrapolate it to an unacceptable conclusion269—here, 
one valid act of reparations for slavery would lead to a plethora 
of future reparations redistributions, which, in the eyes of repa-
rations opponents, would be simply too much. The tyranny of the 
majority argument concerns the efficacy of controls placed upon 
a democratic majority to ensure they do not exploit the minor-
ity.270 If the judiciary recuses itself from meaningful review of 
reparations legislation, the argument would go, there would be 
nothing to stop a majority coalition from going too far. Both con-
cerns are misguided. 
Reparations Takings would constitute a much narrower set 
than economic development Takings. Unlike economic develop-
ment, which continues throughout time and involves a theoreti-
cally infinite number of entities which could benefit from emi-
nent domain, reparations concern only a small number of groups, 
a number which would quickly run out if reparations were pur-
sued in earnest. In other words, because there are only a few 
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demographics which could claim an injury redressable by repa-
rations,271 opportunities for reparations Takings would quickly 
run out—perhaps even after one piece of legislation. The Su-
preme Court upheld economic development as a potentially valid 
public use,272 so the Court should uphold a rationale which is 
considerably narrower and more constrained than economic de-
velopment. 
It is possible that one piece of reparations legislation is un-
satisfactory to its beneficiaries and the beneficiaries continue to 
demand further reparations for the same injury, constituting a 
slippery slope. In the first instance, this is an argument to be 
made to Congress itself in designing the reparations, not an ar-
gument against upholding reparations in court. There is nothing 
illegitimate about being unsatisfied with one legislative attempt 
and calling for another. A more serious worry would be whether 
repeated calls for reparations are a mere pretext for using the 
state for private enrichment. Here, Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence in Kelo is illuminating: Justice Kennedy points out that 
courts can use conventional trial methodology to sort out 
whether the stated goals of legislation are legitimate or merely 
pretextual.273 The dissenting Justices objected that only legisla-
tion drafted by a “stupid staffer” would fail that test,274 but that 
objection puts the cart before the horse. Courts can and should 
be rigorous in trial; the law should not assume a lack of judicial 
rigor before the fact. In any event, that objection was directed 
towards economic development Takings, which, as discussed 
above, are a much broader and more amorphous set than repa-
rations Takings. 
Finally, the basic reality that reparations are so extraordi-
nary and uncommon assuages these concerns. The political suc-
cess of a piece of reparations legislation will depend in large part 
upon the specificity of its articulation and upon the authenticity 
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of the politicians carrying it forward. Any hints of using repara-
tions merely to punish innocent white people or to enrich black 
people far beyond what is called for will seriously damage its po-
litical viability.275 Furthermore, unlike in South Africa, histori-
cally oppressed people remain a minority. It is highly unlikely 
that upholding a reparations bill dealing with property or home-
ownership would lead to a tyrannical outcome. 
  CONCLUSION   
Reparations must certainly be backwards-looking, but they 
are also forward-looking in the sense that they can “creat[e] a 
sense of mutual, interracial trust, respect, and shared des-
tiny.”276 In deciding whether to defer to the legislature’s judg-
ment, courts should remember the unique ability of legislatures 
to envision futures in their own communities. If it comes to pass 
that courts employ the market failure test to evaluate repara-
tions, courts should remember the initial monopoly and the sub-
sequent history of artificial barriers to effective market partici-
pation by African Americans. 
The core concern of this Note is to prepare the judiciary to 
properly receive and evaluate an act of reparations. If that day 
comes, it will come after years of national self-reflection and rec-
onciliation with our neighbors. Let us meet that day with humil-
ity and grace as the judiciary decides the fate of what might be 
our nation’s most serious effort to address our painful history. 
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